On 23 February the UN General Assembly voted massively in favour of a resolution calling for an end to the war in Ukraine and the withdrawal of Russian forces from the country. Western media celebrated this condemnation of Russia by the international community. Only seven countries voted against the resolution and 32 abstained. But this enthusiasm of the western media betrayed a misunderstanding of how the UN works and the significance of General Assembly resolutions. The seven who voted against the resolution were the usual suspects. But those that abstained included significant international actors – not only China but also India. Among those that voted in favour were many – possibly a majority – that maintain close political and commercial ties with Moscow. What the western media failed to understand is that General Assembly resolutions are a convenient way of virtue signalling without having to take any real follow-up action (a bit like posting a Ukrainian flag on your twitter feed). Countries in Africa and Latin America can get western diplomats off their backs by voting for the resolution while continuing to trade with Russia.
My own experience of General Assembly virtue signalling came when I was posted to the UK Mission in New York as a support office during the General Assembly in 1984. The priority for British diplomats at the time was the annual General Assembly vote on the Falklands/Malvinas (only two years after the war) against which we had to lobby. As the most junior member of the Mission, I was sent to lobby the Latin American countries (presumably on the basis that it was a lost cause, and I could do no harm). I was struck by the extent to which, in private, they expressed support for the British position and resentment of the pressure the Argentinians put them under. But they always concluded by apologising that they would have to vote with Argentina to signal Latin American solidarity. Even then the General Assembly was a great place to signal virtue without consequences.
But why do countries who vote against Russia in the General Assembly remain keen to do business with Moscow? Why has the West not been more successful in persuading other countries to impose sanctions on Russia? In part this has been because of a failure of Western diplomacy due to the inability of the West to see the world through the eyes of the other. This was brought home to me during a recent visit to Armenia. Armenia is a country that cannot afford the moralising foreign policy of the West. Its problems are genuinely existential. It is menaced by its neighbour Azerbaijan, whose latest military attacks were against Armenia itself rather than the disputed enclave Nagorno-Karabakh. Its borders with both Azerbaijan and Turkey remain closed. Its border with Georgia is open but, from a trade point of view, complicated by Georgia´s own confrontation with Russia. The border with Iran is open, but Iran is under sanctions and the Armenian government is cautious about being seen as too close to Tehran. Armenia is dependent for its security on Russia which maintains a military base there. It can scarcely be dependent on an EU which regards the corrupt Aliyev family dictatorship in Azerbaijan as a reliable partner (to make sure Europe gets its gas).
Armenians naturally see the situation in Ukraine through the perspective of their own security concerns. They have already experienced the consequences of Russia´s distraction in Ukraine with the blockade of the Lachin corridor linking Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh (in contravention of the agreements signed after the 2020 war). They have suffered an influx of roubles and young Russians avoiding conscription which has distorted the economy and driven housing prices out of the reach of many Armenians. The Armenians I spoke to share no great love of Moscow, do not support Russia´s invasion of Ukraine and resent their dependence on the Russian. But they also worry about the consequences for Armenia of Russian defeat in Ukraine, especially if it provokes political collapse in Moscow. At the very least, Russian military defeat would undermine Moscow´s role as a security guarantor in the Caucasus and Central Asia resulting in significant destabilisation of both regions. In the Caucasus, Dagestan and Ingushetia could seek to break away from Russia. Civil war could return to Chechnya as Kadyrov´s star waned. Georgia would undoubtedly seek to retake the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Armenians fear Azerbaijan taking advantage of the chaos to seize the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh and even resume attacks against Armenia itself. It is little wonder that Armenians, bereft of supporters other than Russia, and unable to depend on the West for protection, see the situation in Ukraine through the perspective of their own survival.
None of this is to suggest that the West should reduce its support for Ukraine or weaken in its resolve. However, if the West wishes to secure wider support for its position on Ukraine it must understand how other countries see the crisis and why their perceptions may not coincide with those of the West. The West does not have to shy away from defeating Russia or need necessarily to offer Putin an off-ramp. But it does need to plan for the wider consequences, whether destabilisation in the Caucasus or Central Asia or collapse in Russia itself. There is no evidence that at the moment it is doing so.